



Nothing Natural About It: Still Searching for a Solution 
to the Chapter 11 Stamp Tax Exemption 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis has wreaked havoc on the U.S. economy.  
It has contributed to the failure of businesses, a decline in consumer 
wealth, and a substantial downturn in economic activity.  Many compa-
nies, small and large, have contemplated or will be forced to contemplate 
bankruptcy.  In fact, during the federal judiciary’s fiscal year ending Sep-
tember 2008, corporate bankruptcies were up 49% from the previous fis-
cal year.1 
Bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11, the Chapter most 
prominently used by corporations, seeks to aid financially troubled enti-
ties by capturing and preserving any value remaining in the company.2  
Under reorganization, as opposed to liquidation, the company continues 
to operate and can do so with a little breathing room.  The company no 
longer fears harassment from creditors or potential litigation, but is able 
to formulate a plan for rehabilitation with the hope of eventually return-
ing to a viable state.3  When the company reorganizes, all parties in-
volved benefit; with the company in a more stable financial position, 
more claims are paid to creditors, jobs are saved, and returns can still be 
produced for stockholders.4 
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 1. Press Release, U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Over One Million for Fiscal Year 2008 (Dec. 
15, 2008) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/BankruptcyFilingsDec2008.cfm. 
 2. 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2797 (2010). 
 3. 10 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 11 U.S.C. Ch. 11 Note (3d ed. 
2010) [hereinafter NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC.]. 
 4. See id. 
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In a typical Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor drafts a reorganiza-
tion plan.5  This plan details how much, and in what form, each creditor 
will be paid; the amount of interest, if any, stockholders will retain; and 
how the business will operate in the future.6  In addition, the plan may 
also include the terms of any proposed sales of the debtor’s assets.7  The 
Bankruptcy Code then requires that, after the creditors have divided up 
into classes of substantially similar claims, they vote.8  If all of the credi-
tors approve the reorganization plan, it is then submitted to the bankrupt-
cy court for confirmation—official approval.9  Conversely, through their 
vote, creditors can veto a sale if their claims are “impaired”—e.g., those 
that preclude receiving payment in full.  By vetoing the reorganization 
plan, creditors can prevent the entire plan’s confirmation.10  If no credi-
tors object and the court approves the reorganization plan, the plan is 
confirmed and the debtor emerges as a reorganized company.11 
To generate the funds needed for a Chapter 11 reorganization, as-
sets may be sold at any time under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.12  The 
Chapter 11 reorganization process costs money,13 and more often than 
not, a financially strapped company will find it “impossible or impru-
dent” to wait to sell off its assets until confirmation of a plan at the end 
of a Chapter 11 case.14  Section 363 allows a trustee or debtor in posses-
sion (DIP),15 with the court’s approval, to “use, sell, or lease, other than 
                                                        
 5. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2009). 
 6. Id. § 1123. 
 7. Paul D. Leake & Mark G. Douglas, Testing the Limits of the Chapter 11 Transfer Tax Ex-
emption: In Search of the Meaning of “Under a Plan Confirmed,” 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 839, 842 
(2005). 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2009). 
 9. Id. §§ 1128–1129. 
 10. Leake & Douglas, supra note 7.  However, if enough creditors vote in favor of the plan, the 
court has the option to “cram down” the plan on those creditors that do not vote in favor of the plan.  
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 
 11. NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., supra note 3.  If the debtor fails to obtain approval within the 
prescribed time limits, the Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding will be converted into a Chapter 7 
liquidation proceeding.  11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2009). 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2009). 
 13. See Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation 
Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization Bankruptcy, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006).  Reorganizations are expen-
sive because they impose upon the debtor both direct and indirect costs.  Id.  Direct bankruptcy costs 
are the out-of-pocket expenditures associated with the bankruptcy proceeding itself, which include 
filing fees, lawyer fees, accountant fees, expert witness fees, trustee fees, and other out-of-pocket 
administrative costs.  Id. at 1278.  In addition, bankruptcy also imposes certain indirect costs, such as 
lost opportunities, time spent in bankruptcy, and lost sales or profits.  Id. at 1270. 
 14. Steven A. Meyerowitz, Supreme Court “Bright Line” Ruling on Scope of Chapter 11 
Transfer Tax Exemption is Bad News for Pre-Confirmation Asset Sales in Bankruptcy, J. BANKR. L. 
2008.09-1 (2008). 
 15. Once the debtor files his petition for relief under Chapter 11, the debtor automatically 
assumes an additional identity as DIP.  11 U.S.C. § 1101 (2009).  A DIP typically refers to the deb-
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in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.”16  These sales 
provide the distressed companies with many benefits, including greater 
leverage with creditors, less oversight and review than under a Chapter 
11 confirmation, and fewer disclosure requirements.17  Moreover, as an 
additional benefit to debtors and purchasers, sales under § 363, under 
certain circumstances,18 cleanse the assets of any prior liens and most 
claims and liabilities.19  Finally, a debtor company further benefits from 
this provision because a sale can be made at any time after the filing for 
bankruptcy and is usually relatively quick, which allows the company to 
maximize the value of the asset.20 
While these sales were initially used only when there was a com-
pelling need, the recent trend has been to use pre-confirmation plan sales 
much more frequently.21  Companies have realized that these sales often 
provide a “cheaper and quicker exit from bankruptcy.”22  In terms of 
overall numbers, thirty-two pre-confirmation plan sales worth $1.6 bil-
lion were announced in the first quarter of 2008 as compared with twen-
ty-one such sales worth $888 million in the first quarter of 2007.23  These 
numbers are only expected to increase given the jump in overall Chapter 
11 filings.24  Indeed, companies as large as Lehman Brothers have taken 
this route.  The global financial-service firm sold its capital markets and 
investment banking businesses under a pre-plan sale for $1.7 billion.25 
Unfortunately, due to a recent Supreme Court decision, a portion of 
these sales suffered a setback.  In June of 2008, in Florida Department of 
Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,26 the Supreme Court settled a cir-
cuit split and issued a bright line rule stating that asset transfers made 
                                                                                                                            
tor’s original management that continues to maintain possession and control of the business during 
the reorganization process.  J. Seth Moore & Vincent P. Slusher, Bankruptcy Code Section 363 
Sales: Trends and Opportunities, 9 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 2 
(2007). 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2009). 
 17. Moore & Vincent, supra note 15. 
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Moore & Vincent, supra note 15.  By contrast, a sale pursuant to a plan involves a pro-
longed notice period and a two-step approval process: (1) a disclosure statement and (2) confirma-
tion of the plan. NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., supra note 3. 
 21. See Moore & Vincent, supra note 15. 
 22. Moore & Vincent, supra note 15; Brief for Professors Richard Aaron et al. as Amici Curae 
Supporting Respondent at 19, Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Piccadilly III), 128 S. 
Ct. 2326 (2008) (No. 07-312), 2008 WL 494942. 
 23. Avital Louria Hahn, An Epilogue to Chapter 11, CFO MAG., May 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11079995?f=related. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Press Release, Orrick Client Alert, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Asset Sale Summary 
(Oct. 31, 2008) (on file with author). 
 26. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006). 
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prior to the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization no longer 
benefit from certain tax exemptions.27  As a result, the cost of selling as-
sets in a bankruptcy case outside of a plan will increase. 
The provision at issue in the case, which exempts asset transfers 
and sales from certain state taxes, contains language ambiguous enough 
that four federal circuit courts have contemplated which types of asset 
sales qualify for the tax benefit.28  Although the Supreme Court set a 
bright line rule that brings clarity and simplicity to the provision, the 
Court ignored the intent behind the provision, and the Court’s decision 
may ultimately result in the exemption’s obsolescence.  As a result, Con-
gress should adopt a revised provision that nullifies the Supreme Court’s 
Piccadilly decision in order to stay true to the purpose behind the Code. 
This Comment analyzes the Piccadilly opinion and its practical ef-
fects.  Part II discusses the history and purpose of the stamp tax exemp-
tion within the Bankruptcy Code.  Part III discusses the circuit split re-
solved by Piccadilly and addresses the problems each side presents.  Part 
IV first presents the background and procedural history of Piccadilly and 
then summarizes the Supreme Court’s creation of the bright line rule and 
decision to limit the tax exemption to post confirmation transfers.  Part V 
critiques the Court’s decision and suggests that Congress reject the Su-
preme Court’s bright line rule and revise the statute to remove the tem-
poral limitation and add a notice provision.  In addition, Part V addresses 
the suggested revision’s application and its potential pitfalls.  Finally, 
Part VI concludes and briefly comments on the future impacts of the de-
cision. 
II.  TAX EXEMPT TRANSFERS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
The Bankruptcy Code contains several “special tax provisions” re-
lating to Chapter 11 business reorganization.29  This Part and Part III dis-
cuss one such provision, § 1146(a).  Section 1146(a) exempts any stamp 
or similar tax imposed by state or local authorities on “the issuance, 
transfer or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an in-
strument of transfer under a plan confirmed” under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.30 
                                                        
 27. Id. at 2339. 
 28. Compare City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc. (In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc.), 758 F.2d 
840, 841 (2d Cir. 1985), and Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. T.H. Orlando Ltd., et al. (In re T.H. Orlando Ltd.), 
391 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2004), with NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, 
L.P.), 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999), and Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In re 
Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), 335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 1146 (2009). 
 30. Id. § 1146(a).  Before October 17, 2005, 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) was previously designated as 
§ 1146(c).  However, under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
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The purpose and origins of the stamp tax exemption aid in under-
standing its scope.  The primary purpose of the special tax provisions is 
to balance the objectives of state and local tax codes with those of the 
Bankruptcy Code and therefore limit any negative effects these tax poli-
cies may have on the bankruptcy process.31  Thus, Congress enacted the 
stamp tax exemption in order to provide relief from taxes that might be 
imposed on the transfer of assets to a restructuring business.32  Con-
gress’s objective in enacting the stamp tax exemption was simple: By 
exempting the stamp tax, a larger amount of the profits generated by the 
sale are available to creditors, and the likelihood the debtor will success-
fully emerge from reorganization increases.33 
The stamp tax exemption originated under § 77B(f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.  The Act exempted from federal transfer taxes “the 
issuance, transfers, or exchanges of securities or making or delivery of 
conveyances to make effective any plan of reorganization confirmed un-
der the provisions of this section.”34  Section 77B(f) was replaced with 
§ 267 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, which expanded the stamp tax ex-
emption to both state and federal taxes, and the language evolved from 
transfers that serve “to make effective any plan” to those that arise “un-
der any plan confirmed.”35, 36  The litigation surrounding the tax exemp-
                                                                                                                            
(BAPCPA) of 2005, both §§ 1146(a) and 1146(b) were deleted.  Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 719(b)(3), 119 
Stat. 23, 133.  The substance of the new subsection (a) is identical to that of the old subsection (c).  
For simplicity, the provision will be referred to as the “stamp tax exemption.” 
 31. Robert A. Morse, Annotation, Exemption, Under 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c), From Payment of 
Tax Under Any Law Imposing Stamp Tax or Similar Tax, 108 A.L.R. FED. 701 (1992). 
 32. John C. Murray, Transfer-Tax Considerations in Real Estate Bankruptcy Proceedings, 38 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 377, 379 (2003). 
 33. Id.  Murray states the following: 
Congress enacted [the stamp tax exemption] to facilitate reorganization by giving debtors 
tax relief from stamp or similar tax, such as transfer taxes, for transfers of property pur-
suant to an instrument of transfer under a confirmed plan.  By exempting the transaction 
from tax, [the stamp tax exemption] reduces the obligations encumbering the property, 
thereby making a greater portion of the sale proceeds available to creditors and affords 
debtor a quick and efficient means of distributing and discharging its obligations under 
the plan. 
Id. (citing In re Kerner Printing Co. 188 B.R. 121, 124 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
 34. Act of Jun. 7, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-296, 48 Stat. 911, 919 (1934). 
 35. Act of Jun. 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 903–904 (1938).  See generally 6A 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 15.08 at 836−837 (14th ed. 1977).  H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 281 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6238.  The leading contemporary bankruptcy treatise 
asserts that the provision was not extended to exempt any taxes on transfers “which occur prior to 
confirmation of the plan and which are merely prepatory steps.”  6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
§ 15.08, at 840.  No reason was provided for why the language was changed.  See 52 Stat. at 903–
904. 
 36. Congress used virtually the same language in the subsequent BAPCPA revisions, including 
the phrase “under a plan confirmed.”  11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (2009).  With the BAPCPA revisions of 
2005, Congress made several significant changes to the Bankruptcy Code while attempting to, 
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tion provision has focused on two areas of debate: (1) the type of transfer 
the exemption applies and (2) the proper timing of the transfer as dictated 
by the language of the statute.  This Part will address the first of these 
issues, and Part III will discuss the timing issue as it relates to asset sales 
under § 1146(a). 
The provision’s application to various types of state taxes was the 
first area of dispute. The stamp tax exemption specifically exempts a 
“stamp tax or similar tax,”37 but the scope of the provision is unclear due 
to the noticeable lack of a definition of stamp or similar tax within the 
code.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a stamp tax as “a tax imposed by 
requiring the purchase of a revenue stamp that must be affixed to a legal 
document (such as a deed or note) before the document can be record-
ed.”38  Many courts have addressed this issue.  The Second Circuit has 
asserted that all stamp or similar taxes share the following elements: 
(1) they are imposed only at the time of transfer or sale of the item 
at issue; (2) the amount due is determined by the consideration for, 
par value of, or value of the time being transferred; (3) the tax rate 
is a relatively small percentage of the consideration, par value or 
value of the property; (4) the tax is imposed irrespective of whether 
the transferor enjoyed a gain or suffered a loss on the underlying 
sale or transfer; and (5) in the case of state documentary transfer 
taxes, the tax must be paid as a prerequisite to recording.39, 40 
Thirty-seven states impose a tax that is covered by the statute at either 
the state, county, or municipal level.41  These taxes, most commonly used 
on the recording of deeds, mortgages, or leases, are generally a very 
small percentage of the overall transaction (typically 1% or less).42  De-
spite their seemingly nominal value, the classification of these taxes, as 
well as when they may be tax exempt, generates significant controversy. 
                                                                                                                            
among other things, make it more difficult for some consumers to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7.  
Id. 
 37. Id. § 1146(a). 
 38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (9th ed. 2009). 
 39. 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., L.P. v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. (In re 995 Fifth Ave. 
Assocs. L.P.), 963 F.2d 503, 512 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 40. In contrast, courts have also ruled that sales and capital gains taxes are not considered 
stamp taxes because they are too high and, unlike stamp taxes, are imposed solely for gain or profit.  
Murray, supra note 32, at 385. 
 41. Brief for the States of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Fla. Dep’t 
of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008) (No. 07-312), 2008 WL 345045. 
 42. National Association of Realtors, Summary of Real Estate Transfer Taxes by State (Aug. 
15, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.realtor.org/library/library/fg717. 
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III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The second area of debate surrounding the stamp tax exemption 
spurred a split among the federal circuit courts.  This split hinged largely 
on whether the stamp tax exemption includes a timing element in order 
for a transfer to qualify for the tax exemption.  Specifically, the dispute 
related to the interpretation of the requirement that the transfer be made 
“under a plan confirmed.”  There were two schools of thought.43  The 
Court of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh Circuits broadly followed 
the “‘necessity’ interpretation,” requiring only that the transfer be neces-
sary to the confirmation of a plan for the exemption to be valid.  In con-
trast, the Court of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits followed a 
“‘temporal limitation’ interpretation” of the stamp tax exemption, requir-
ing that a transfer occur post-conformation for the exemption to be valid. 
The circuit split developed in 1999 when the Fourth Circuit rejected 
the Second Circuit’s more expansive necessity approach adopted in City 
of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., and instead interpreted “under a 
plan confirmed” as including a temporal limitation.44  This split has led 
to an uncertainty regarding the scope of the tax exemption.  After the 
split developed, debtors in jurisdictions that had yet to rule on the issue 
were left in a state of uncertainty as to whether their pre-confirmation 
asset transfers would receive the same tax benefits as any post-
confirmation transfers.  The following discussion tracks the origins and 
development of the circuit split.  Specifically, section A discusses the 
necessity interpretation, and then, section B discusses the temporal limi-
tation interpretation.  Both sections also discuss the problems that each 
interpretation presents. 
A.  Necessary to the Confirmation of the Plan 
The Second Circuit, as the first federal circuit court to address the 
issue of whether the stamp tax exemption45 includes a temporal limita-
tion, developed the necessity interpretation,46 which was eventually em-
braced by the majority of bankruptcy courts.47  The court developed the 
necessity interpretation in City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender. 48  In Ja-
                                                        
 43. Throughout this Comment, the two predominant views will be referred to as the “‘necessi-
ty’ interpretation” and the “‘temporal limitation’ interpretation.” 
 44. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442, 456 (4th 
Cir. 1999); City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc. (In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc.), 758 F.2d 840, 841 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
 45. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (2009). 
 46. Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 840–41. 
 47. Leake & Douglas, supra note 7, at 855. 
 48. Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 840–41 (holding that the New York City Property Transfer Tax 
is a “similar tax” under 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c)). 
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coby-Bender, the court affirmed a bankruptcy decision, which held that 
the delivery of a deed transferring a building to The Hearst Corporation 
occurred under a confirmed reorganization plan and was thus exempt 
from all stamp or similar taxes.49  While not a pre-confirmation transfer, 
the sale at issue was a post-confirmation transfer that was not specifically 
authorized by the reorganization plan but was necessary to the plan’s 
consummation—the eventual emergence from bankruptcy.50 
The City of New York argued that because the plan did not mention 
the transfer nor provide authority to make the sale, delivery could not 
have been made under the plan as required by the code.51  In rejecting 
this argument, the court found that the statute does not require a specific 
reorganization plan.52  It was sufficient that “the plan’s consummation 
depended almost entirely upon the sale of the building.”53  Thus, the 
Second Circuit’s decision stating that the transfer did not have to be in-
cluded within the confirmed plan as long as the transfer was necessary 
for the plan’s consummation created the necessity interpretation. 
Bankruptcy courts and other federal circuit courts extended this al-
ready expansive view of the stamp tax exemption to sanction not only 
those sales “necessary to the consummation of a plan, but [also] those 
necessary to the confirmation of a plan.”54  Thus, under a plan confirmed 
also applied to those transfers that took place before a plan was con-
firmed, so long as it was “necessary” or “essential” to the confirmation 
of a plan. 
Similarly, once the split developed,55 the Eleventh Circuit weighed 
in on the issue and further expanded the scope of under a plan con-
firmed.56  In State of Florida, Department of Revenue v. T.H. Orlando 
Ltd., the debtor, a hotel owner, filed an action against the Florida De-
partment of Revenue seeking declaratory relief and requesting a refund 
of $161,425 for stamp taxes paid in connection with a $29,350,000 mort-
gage refinancing.57  The issue the court considered was whether a trans-
                                                        
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 840. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442, 456 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (citing In re Smoss Enterprises Corp., 54 B.R. 950, 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that a 
sale was under a plan because “the transfer of property was essential to the confirmation of the 
plan”)). 
 55. See infra Part III.B. 
 56. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. T.H. Orlando Ltd. et al. (In re T.H. Orlando Ltd.), 391 F.3d 1287 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
 57. Id. at 1289–90. 
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action between two non-debtors was exempt from the stamp taxes when 
the transaction was specifically considered in the confirmed plan.58 
The parties involved in the dispute did not include the debtor, but 
rather an adjacent landowner and the new lender.59  Nonetheless, the 
court found that without these two parties, the plan would never have 
been consummated because the first lender would have foreclosed on the 
mortgage, leaving the unsecured creditors with nothing.60  The court dis-
tinguished T.H. Orlando Ltd. from those cases where the transaction 
could have been completed by other means, including an outright pur-
chase.61  Here, the transfer was not irrelevant but essential because the 
plan would have failed without it.62  Ultimately, the court held that under 
a plan confirmed refers to a transfer that is necessary to the consumma-
tion of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.63, 64 
Originating over twenty years ago in Jacoby-Bender, the necessity 
interpretation has been embraced by numerous courts and applied to 
transfers both pre- and post-confirmation.  However, despite these en-
dorsements, this interpretation is flawed.  With little regulation, the use 
of the tax provision has increased along with scope of the interpreta-
tion.65  Critics argue that the necessity interpretation sets a vague stan-
dard and creates a windfall for debtors at the expense of state taxing au-
thorities.66  Recently, the trend has been to include a boilerplate provision 
in the standard pre-confirmation asset sale motion, which usually seeks 
to “avoid any taxes ‘under any law imposing a stamp or similar tax.’”67  
However, this broad language, which is simply tacked on to the asset sale 
motion, does not generally contain the amount of the tax or even the list-
ing of the property being transferred.68  As a result, the state tax authori-
ties argue they have no notice as to whether or not they will be affected 
by the transfer.69  This practice then allows the debtor to take advantage 
                                                        
 58. Id. at 1290. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1294. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1295. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Although the court did not address the precise issue of whether the stamp tax exemption 
applies to pre-confirmation transfers, the court’s decision was a precursor to the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Piccadilly.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 65. See Karen Cordy, The Incredible Expanding § 1146(c), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, 
at 10. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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of the exemption, while little is documented with either the court or the 
city.70 
This flaw spurs additional problems when the debtor utilizes the tax 
exemption and then subsequently fails to confirm a plan.  Only about 
25% of Chapter 11 plans are confirmed; the vast majority of cases that 
begin under Chapter 11 are dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 proceed-
ings.71  Clearly, this was never Congress’s intent.  Further, the taxing 
authority argues that attempts to collect the tax from the debtor after the 
fact are highly impractical because the state will face high administrative 
costs in doing so.72 
B.  Temporal Limitation 
The necessity interpretation of the stamp tax exemption dominated 
the jurisdictions and was the only view endorsed by a circuit court until 
the Fourth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and lower courts’ use of this 
interpretation in NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts in 
1999.73  In NVR, the Fourth Circuit rejected the necessity interpretation 
and, instead, held that the stamp tax exemption includes a temporal limi-
tation.74  NVR, a leading homebuilder, acquired Ryan Homes in an effort 
to expand its business.75  NVR financed this deal, incurring over $450 
billion in debt.76  Unable to meet its financial obligations, NVR filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11.77  During the five-month period after filing 
and before emerging from bankruptcy, NVR made 5,671 real property 
transfers and incurred $8,439,103 in transfer and recordation taxes, the 
majority of which were paid to the taxing authorities in Pennsylvania and 
Maryland.78  Ultimately, the court concluded, “transfers taking place 
prior to the date of the reorganization plan’s confirmation are not cov-
ered by [the stamp tax exemption].”79 
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit cited the holding in 
California State Board of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., in which 
the court stated that, “[a]lthough Congress can confer an immunity from 
state taxation, . . . a court must proceed carefully when asked to recog-
                                                        
 70. See id. 
 71. Transcript of Oral Argument, Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 
2326 (No. 07-312), 2008 WL 791974 at *3–*4. 
 72. Id. at *18–*19. 
 73. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 447. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 447. 
 78. Id. at 448. 
 79. Id. at 456. 
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nize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly ex-
pressed.”80  The court asserted that this passage dictates that courts must 
narrowly construe tax provisions in favor of the state.81  Thus, using the 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word “under,”82 which means 
inferior or subordinate, the Fourth Circuit could not hold that a pre-
confirmation transfer could be subordinate to or authorized by something 
that did not exist at the time of the transfer.83 
In 2003, the Third Circuit entered the fray with Baltimore County v. 
Hechinger Liquidation Trust84 and sided with the Fourth Circuit, agree-
ing that courts should take a restrictive approach when dealing with the 
stamp tax exemption.85  Hechinger, a retailer of home and garden care 
products, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in June of 1999.86  In Oc-
tober, Hechinger requested permission to make certain real estate sales 
prior to confirmation of the plan.87  Hechinger’s motion also requested 
that the court find the sales exempt from taxes under the stamp tax ex-
emption provision.88 
Despite objections by the taxing authorities that the proposed sales 
were not being made under a confirmed plan, the bankruptcy court ap-
proved the sales and declared them exempt from transfer and recording 
taxes.89  The Third Circuit, in an opinion authored by then Third Circuit 
Judge Alito, reversed, holding that under a plan confirmed means “‘made 
pursuant to the authority conferred by such a plan,’ and since an uncon-
firmed plan cannot confer such authority, this interpretation means that a 
transfer made prior to plan confirmation cannot qualify for tax exemp-
tion.”90 
In adopting this temporal limitation interpretation of under a plan 
confirmed, the Third and Fourth Circuits asserted that transfers occurring 
before a plan is confirmed, regardless of their importance to the plan, do 
not qualify for the tax benefit.  This assertion is based on a narrow and 
strict textualist interpretation of under a plan confirmed.  However, the 
temporal limitation interpretation is not without its own fair share of crit-
                                                        
 80. Id. at 457 (citing Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 
(1989)). 
 81. Id. 
 82 Id.  (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  1525 (6th ed. 1990)).  
 83. Id. 
 84. Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), 
335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 246. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 246–47. 
 90. Id. at 254. 
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ics.91  Critics of this interpretation argue that the temporal limitation (1) 
draws an arbitrary line and, as a result, is under inclusive and (2) does 
not comport with the practical realities of Chapter 11 reorganization.92 
First, critics argue that in limiting the scope of the provision, the 
temporal limitation interpretation draws a strict line between transfers 
that qualify for the transfer tax exemption and those that do not.93  A 
transfer that is essential to the plan but occurs one day before plan con-
firmation is barred, while a transfer that occurs one day after will qualify 
regardless of whether it is necessary or essential to the plan.  One of the 
goals of the stamp tax exemption is to provide tax relief to distressed 
companies while encouraging asset sales to preserve any remaining value 
and increase the debtor’s chance of a successful reorganization.94  The 
line created by the temporal limitation arbitrarily limits the extension of 
the tax provision to those debtors who can afford to wait for plan confir-
mation and rejects those debtors who need to sell assets earlier in order 
to fund their reorganization.95 
Second, critics argue that the temporal limitation fails to comport 
with the practical realities of Chapter 11 reorganization.96  Because of 
their numerous benefits, the increased use of pre-confirmation asset sales 
will likely continue despite an inability to take advantage of the exemp-
tion, and less money will be available for creditors and reorganization.  
The reality is that these transfer taxes are far too small to drive the timing 
of an asset sale.97  The benefit to those who take the time and effort to 
hold off on the deal until the plan has been confirmed will be nominal.  
Furthermore, the numerous benefits associated with a pre-confirmation 
asset sale—such as simplicity, speed, and the lack of liens and encum-
                                                        
 91. See, e.g., David Stratton, Real Property Transfers and Bankruptcy Tax Exemptions: In re 
Hechinger and 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at 32; Lorenzo Marinuzzi 
& Jordan Wishew, Piccadilly Cafeterias: Congress Should Revisit Supreme Court Bright Line Test, 
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 27, 2008, at 1. 
 92. Marinuzzi & Wishew, supra note 91. 
 93. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 91. 
 94. See supra notes 32–34. 
 95. See Stratton, supra note 91. 
 96. Marinuzzi & Wishew, supra note 91. 
 97. Brief for the States of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 41, at 
14.  The brief stated the following: 
In fact we know of no reported cases finding that but for the availability of the exemp-
tion, an assets sale would not have gone forward. Nor are there any reported cases finding 
that a debtor was unable to confirm a plan because it had to pay the transfer tax on a pre-
confirmation sale. 
Id.  Moreover, companies continue with these transfers despite having to pay sales or capital gains 
tax, which can range up to the high teens.  Id. 
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brances—serve as powerful incentives to “engage in these pre-plan 
transactions, even without [the] minor added tax advantage.”98 
In addition, even if the tax benefit is an attractive incentive, given 
the recent trouble in the credit markets, companies will face additional 
difficulties in obtaining the financing needed to fund the reorganization.  
As a result, many debtors will be unable to postpone a sale until plan 
confirmation solely to preserve the tax exemption.  With the increase in 
pre-confirmation asset sales, this use of the tax exemption provision will 
also likely decline.  Because the taxes will still need to be paid, either the 
burden will be placed on the purchaser, hurting the bidding process, or 
on the debtor, resulting in less proceeds from the sale.  Either way, credi-
tors will end up with less money. 
IV.  FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC. 
Less than twenty years after the circuit split developed, the Su-
preme Court, in a 7–2 decision, settled the debate in Florida Department 
of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.99  By issuing a “simple, bright 
line rule” that the stamp tax exemption does not apply to an asset sale 
made before the debtor’s plan is confirmed under Chapter 11, the majori-
ty of the Court squared largely with the temporal limitation interpretation 
previously used by the Third and Fourth Circuits.100  This Part begins by 
examining the background and procedural history of Piccadilly.  Then, 
this Part discusses the Court’s ruling in more detail, examining the argu-
ments presented in the majority opinion and dissent. 
A.  Course of Bankruptcy Proceedings 
In operation for over sixty years, Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Picca-
dilly) was once one of the most successful and largest cafeteria chains in 
the Southeast.101  However, due to financial difficulties, on October 29, 
2003, Piccadilly declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code.102  Piccadilly entered bankruptcy with the belief that an asset 
sale would be the best way to maximize its enterprise value.103  The day 
before filing, Piccadilly executed an asset purchase agreement with Pic-
cadilly Acquisition Corporation (PAC), an affiliate of TruFoods Corpo-
                                                        
 98. Id. at 12. 
 99. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Piccadilly III), 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 
(2006). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2230. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.) (Picca-
dilly I), 379 B.R. 215, 217 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 
S. Ct. 2326 (2006). 
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ration, for the sale of all of Piccadilly’s assets for $54 million.104  With 
the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, Piccadilly also filed a 
motion requesting leave to sell substantially all of its assets free and clear 
of all liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests.105 
Although Piccadilly had already entered into the purchase agree-
ment, it requested the bankruptcy court’s permission to conduct an auc-
tion, which would entitle the highest bidder to purchase the assets.106  In 
addition, Piccadilly requested that the sale be exempt from any stamp 
taxes.107  Just over a month later, the Court approved the bidding process, 
using PAC’s $54 million offer as the opening minimum bid.108  Ultimate-
ly, Piccadilly Investments, LLC had the winning bid of $80 million.109 
Next, Piccadilly entered into a global settlement agreement (“Glob-
al Settlement”), which resolved the priority of distribution among Picca-
dilly’s creditors; Piccadilly contended that the Global Settlement was 
“analogous to a confirmation of a plan.”110  In response, the bankruptcy 
court conducted a sale hearing approving the asset sale to Piccadilly In-
vestments, the Global Settlement, and the tax exemption on the sale un-
der the stamp tax exemption provision.111 
Four parcels of land were among the assets sold, and Florida as-
serted that each sale was subject to stamp taxes.112  Accordingly, the 
Florida Department of Revenue filed a motion to reconsider the sale or-
der.113  However, the bankruptcy court entered an amended sale order 
over Florida’s objections, ultimately approving the sale.114  Shortly the-
reafter, Piccadilly filed its initial Chapter 11 plan and disclosure state-
ment; it later filed an amended plan, to which Florida again objected, still 
maintaining that it was entitled to collect the taxes.115  In addition, Flori-
                                                        
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 218. 
 107. Id. at 217. 
 108. “As the initial bidder, Piccadilly Acquisition Corporation served as a so-called ‘stalking 
horse’ whose initial research, due diligence, and subsequent bid may encourage later bidders. . . . For 
its role, Piccadilly Acquisition Corporation was entitled to receive a breakup fee.”  Id. at 218, n.6. 
 109. Id. at 218. 
 110. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.) (Picca-
dilly II), 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Piccadilly I, 379 B.R. 215, 218 (S.D.Fla. 2006), aff’d, 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 
2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006). 
 113. Piccadilly II, 484 F.3d at 1301. 
 114. The sale order was amended in order to alter the manner in which secured noteholders 
could accept payment.  Piccadilly I, 379 B.R. at 218 n.9.  The asset sale closed the next day.  Picca-
dilly II, 484 F.3d at 1301. 
 115. Piccadilly II, 484 F.3d at 1301. 
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da initiated an adversary proceeding requesting a declaration that the as-
set sale was not exempt from stamp taxes.116 
Almost seven months later, the bankruptcy court confirmed Picca-
dilly’s amended plan over the Department of Revenue’s objections.117  
The court ruled that the tax exemption applied on the grounds that the 
sale was necessary for the eventual consummation of the Chapter 11 re-
organization plan.118 
The district court and the Eleventh Circuit both affirmed.  The Ele-
venth Circuit rejected the temporal limitations followed by the Third and 
Fourth Circuits and instead held that “[transfer] tax exemptions may ap-
ply to those pre-confirmation transfers that are necessary to the consum-
mation of a confirmed plan of reorganization, which at the very least, 
requires that there be some nexus between the pre-confirmation transfer 
and the confirmed plan.”119  It is under these circumstances that Piccadil-
ly was before the Supreme Court. 
B.  The Supreme Court Opinion 
After years of confusion regarding the stamp tax exemption,120 the 
Supreme Court finally granted certiorari.  In resolving the circuit split, 
the Supreme Court took a textualist approach to the stamp tax exemp-
tion121 and issued a bright line rule that the tax exemption only applies to 
post-confirmation asset transfers.122 
1.  Majority Opinion 
On June 16, 2008, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.123  The Court’s 
analysis of the statute was broken into three parts: (1) the ambiguity of 
the statute; (2) Piccadilly’s argument that even if not facially ambiguous, 
the provision is ambiguous when compared to other provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code; and (3) the canons of statutory construction asserted 
by each party.124  This sub-section will address each of these issues in the 
same order as the Court addressed them. 
                                                        
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1304. 
 120. 11 U.S.C. § 1146 (2009). 
 121. Id. § 1146(a). 
 122. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Piccadilly III), 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2339 
(2006). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 2331–39. 
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The Court first addressed the ambiguity of the stamp tax exemption 
language.125  Florida argued that the meaning of “under a plan con-
firmed” in the statute is not ambiguous.  It asserted that the word “con-
firmed” is a past participle, modifying the word “plan.”126  As a past par-
ticiple, “confirmed” indicates a completed action, meaning that a plan 
confirmed denotes a confirmed plan or, in other words, a plan that has 
been confirmed in the past.127 
Moreover, Florida urged the Court to define the word “under” as 
“with the authorization of” or “inferior or subordinate to” the confirmed 
plan.128  In doing so, Florida referred to the two other uses of “under” 
within the provision where “under” is clearly used as “subject to.”129  
Evoking a similar argument to the one used in In re NVR, LP, Florida 
asserted that to be eligible for the exemption, a transfer must be subject 
to a confirmed plan, and likewise, a pre-confirmation transfer cannot be 
made subject to a plan that does not exist at the time the transfer is 
made.130 
In contrast, Piccadilly argued that the stamp tax exemption does not 
include a temporal requirement.  Piccadilly asserted that “plan con-
firmed” and “confirmed plan” are not the same, and if Congress had in-
deed intended the latter, it would have used that language.131  In fact, in a 
related provision, § 1142(b), Congress did use “confirmed plan.”132  Pic-
cadilly also rejected Florida’s proposed definition of “under,” arguing 
that one could just as easily read the term as “in accordance with” and 
pointing out that the numerous dictionary definitions demand the mean-
ing be drawn from the context surrounding the term.133  If nothing else, 
                                                        
 125. Id. at 2331–33; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (“The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a 
security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed . . . , may not 
be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.”). 
 126. “[I].e., ‘[a] verb form indicating past or completed action or time that is used as a verbal 
adjective in phrases such as baked beans and finished work.’”  Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2331 
(citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1287 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 127. Id. at 2331–32. 
 128. Id. at 2332. 
 129. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (“The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the 
making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this 
title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.”) (emphasis added). 
 130. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2232; see discussion supra Part III.B. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (2009) (“The court may direct the debtor and any other necessary 
party to execute or deliver or to join in the execution or delivery of any instrument required to effect 
a transfer of property dealt with by a confirmed plan, and to perform any other act, including the 
satisfaction of any lien, that is necessary for the consummation of the plan.”) (emphasis added). 
 133. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2332.  The court summarized Piccadilly’s argument as fol-
lows: 
[Piccadilly] observes that the variability of the term “under” is well-documented, noting 
that the American Heritage Dictionary 1395 (1976) provides 15 definitions, including 
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Piccadilly argued, the language of the stamp tax exemption could have at 
least more than one interpretation. 
Conceding that both sides proffered credible interpretations, the 
Court concluded that Florida’s interpretation of “under a plan confirmed” 
is the better one.134  While admitting that Congress could have been 
clearer, the Court viewed Florida’s interpretation as a simpler construc-
tion and the more natural reading of the statute, noting that Piccadilly’s 
version places a “greater strain on the statutory text.”135 
The Court next addressed Piccadilly’s argument that even if not fa-
cially ambiguous, the provision is ambiguous when compared to other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.136  Piccadilly again asserted that 
Congress would have included a temporal limitation, as it did in other 
code provisions, if it had intended for there to be one.  Because the stamp 
tax exemption lacks an explicit temporal provision, Piccadilly argued 
that the Court must presume that Congress acted intentionally when ex-
cluding the language.137 
Piccadilly also proffered several examples of code provisions where 
using Florida’s definition of “under” as “authorized by” would not com-
port with the meaning of the provision.  For example, the term “under” in 
§ 303(a), which reads “[a]n involuntary case may be commenced only 
under chapter 7 or 11 of this title,” cannot mean  “authorized by” because 
§ 303(a) itself authorizes involuntary cases and the provisions of Chap-
ters 7 and 11 do not.138  Thus, Piccadilly contended that “under” is ambi-
guous.139 
Florida rejected Piccadilly’s argument on the grounds that it would 
be redundant for Congress to include any further temporal limitation.140  
Florida argued that the stamp tax exception must apply to post-
confirmation transfers because of its location within the code.141  The 
subchapter within which the stamp tax exemption is located is entitled 
                                                                                                                            
“[i]n view of,” “because of,” “by virtue of,” as well as “[s]ubject to the restraint . . . of.”  
See also Ardestani (citation omitted) (recognizing that “[t]he word ‘under’ has many dic-
tionary definitions and must draw its meaning from its context”).  Although “under” ap-
pears several times in [the stamp tax exemption], Piccadilly maintains there is no reason 
why a term of such common usage and variable meaning must have the same meaning 
each time it is used, even in the same sentence. 
Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2333. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2333–34. 
 139. Id. at 2334. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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“POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS.”142  Basing its argument on the 
textual canon of statutory interpretation that suggests a court should in-
terpret a code in its context and consistent with the chapter within which 
it appears, Florida claimed the tax exemption should apply only to post-
confirmation transfers as dictated by the heading.143 
Siding again with Florida, the Court rejected Piccadilly’s argument 
that the statute is ambiguous when compared to other provisions of the 
code.144  If anything, the Court found Piccadilly’s arguments to support 
the opposite conclusion—that the statutory context suggests that the 
stamp tax exemption is inapplicable to pre-confirmation transfers.145 
The Court finally focused on the four substantive canons of statuto-
ry construction asserted within the parties’ arguments.  Florida’s argu-
ments included two canons: (1) “Congress is presumed to be aware of an 
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that in-
terpretation when it reenacts a statute without change;”146 and (2) courts 
should “proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from 
state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed.”147 
Florida contended that the language within the tax exemption pro-
vision has remained the same since 1978, despite several revisions to the 
Bankruptcy Code, including the most recent 2005 BAPCPA revision that 
occurred before the Eleventh Circuit’s decision below.148  Because Con-
gress re-adopted the stamp tax provision as § 1146 (a) with the exact 
same language, Florida asserted that Congress ratified the longstanding 
temporal limitation as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit in NVR and the 
Third Circuit in Hechinger.149 
Florida also contended that the federalism principle articulated in 
Sierra Summit—that courts should proceed carefully when asked to rec-
ognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly 
expressed—demands that the provision be strictly construed in favor of 
                                                        
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 2234–35 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It’s 
a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their con-
text and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”)). 
 144. Id. at 2335. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 2336 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978)).  The BAPCPA 
amendments occurred in 2005, before the Eleventh Circuit’s Piccadilly decision, but after the Fourth 
Circuit decided NVR and the Third Circuit decided Hechinger, both of which held that pre-
confirmation transfers were not tax exempt. 
 147. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2336–37 (quoting Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra 
Summit, Inc. 490 U.S. 844, 851–52 (1989)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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the states to prevent “unwarranted displacement of their tax laws.”150  
Furthermore, Florida argued that this canon also discouraged the exten-
sion of the exemption to pre-confirmation transfers because it is a direct 
interference with the administration of a state’s taxation scheme, which, 
in this case, is imposed “prior to recordation” of the transfer instru-
ment.151  In response, Piccadilly asserted that when the exemption from 
state taxation is clearly expressed, the canon is inapplicable.152  Thus, 
because here Congress clearly intended to exempt a category of state 
taxation, the federalism canon argument must fail.153 
Piccadilly continued by offering two additional substantive canons 
to support its arguments: (1) “provisions allowing preferences must be 
tightly construed,”154 and (2) “a remedial statute such as the Bankruptcy 
Code should be liberally construed.”155  First, Piccadilly maintained that 
Florida’s stamp tax is the equivalent of a preference in favor of a particu-
lar claimant.  Arguing that Florida’s stamp tax is nothing more than a 
post-petition claim or administrative expense that is paid ahead of most 
creditors’ pre-petition claims, Piccadilly asserted that a narrow interpre-
tation of the stamp tax exemption “is not only inconsistent with the poli-
cy of equality distribution” but also “dilutes the value of the priority for 
those creditors Congress intended to prefer.”156 
Second, Piccadilly reasoned that the Court should construe the 
Bankruptcy Code liberally because the tax exemption provision is a re-
medial statute.157  Piccadilly asserted that the tax exemption’s main pur-
pose is to facilitate the Chapter 11 process by providing tax relief.158  As 
a result, the courts should interpret any ambiguities in the text in a man-
ner that furthers the policy goals of maximizing asset value and, thus, the 
property available for creditors.159 
The Court, finding Florida’s federalism canon argument to be deci-
sive, declined to interpret the statute liberally.160  Justice Thomas wrote 
that interpreting the statute liberally would be “recognizing an exemption 
                                                        
 150. Id. at 2337. 
 151. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 201.01, 201.02(1) (2006)). 
 152. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2337. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667 
(2006)). 
 155. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2337. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 2337–38. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 2338. 
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from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed.”161  Moreo-
ver, the Court found that Piccadilly’s argument proves this point; be-
cause Piccadilly rested its case on the assertion that the language of the 
stamp tax exemption is ambiguous as opposed to express, it follows that 
Congress could not have intended the exemption to apply to pre-
confirmation transfers.162 
The Court also rejected both of Piccadilly’s substantive canons, 
finding both inapplicable.  First, although preferences must be tightly 
construed, the Court found that the stamp tax exemption is not a prefe-
rence granting provision and makes no mention of preferences within the 
text.163  Second, the Court declined to interpret the statute liberally in 
order to serve its remedial purpose because interpreting the provision in 
this way would “stretch the disallowance wall beyond what the statutory 
text can naturally bear.”164  While the Court acknowledged the practical 
realities of Chapter 11 reorganizations and the various policy goals be-
hind the Bankruptcy Code, it left the ultimate decision to revise the pro-
vision to the legislature rather than the judiciary.165 
In summation, the Court adopted the bright line rule that “section 
1146 affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a 
Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed.”166 
2.  The Dissenting Justices Rejection of the Temporal Interpretation 
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer167 and joined by 
Justice Souter, rejected the majority opinion, characterized the language 
of the stamp tax exemption as ambiguous, and argued the necessity in-
terpretation is more appropriate.168  Justice Breyer disagreed with the 
majority’s textualist approach and asserted that in the “absence of a clear 
answer in text or canons,” he would prefer looking towards the exemp-
tion’s purpose—to encourage and facilitate bankruptcy asset sales.169 
The dissenters acknowledged that the pre-confirmation bankruptcy 
process is time consuming and that there are circumstances where the 
debtor must sell assets quickly, rather than wait for confirmation, in or-
                                                        
 161. Id. at 2338 (quoting Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 
851–52 (1989)). 
 162. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2338. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 2339. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 2339–42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer, unsurprisingly, was also the most 
hostile during oral arguments.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (No. 
07-312), 2008 WL 791974. 
 168. See Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2339–42. 
 169. Id. at 2341–42. 
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der to preserve the maximum value of the asset.170  Recognizing first that 
a pre-confirmation asset sale is a valuable tool for generating more reve-
nue for creditors and second that stamp taxes accomplish the inverse by 
reducing the funds available, Justice Breyer made clear that the majori-
ty’s opinion failed to accomplish Congress’s primary objectives in enact-
ing the stamp tax exemption.171  By limiting the statute’s application to 
narrow circumstances, the majority’s rationale actually leads to an inap-
posite result. 
The dissenting Justices believed the majority’s rule was inappro-
priate and suggested a different standard.  Justice Breyer expanded on his 
critique of the majority’s approach, asserting that the bright line rule 
could harm creditors.172  The threat of losing the stamp tax exemption 
may influence the debtor to forego the extra revenue generated in a quick 
asset sale in order to protect the exemption under the longer confirmation 
process.173  This forgone revenue in turn decreases the amount of money 
available to the estate and to creditors.  Frustrated by these results, Jus-
tice Breyer advocated for a more flexible standard.174 
What conceivable reason could Congress have had for silently writ-
ing into the statute’s language a temporal distinction with such con-
sequences?  The majority can find none.  It simply says that the re-
sult is not ‘absurd’ and notes the advantages of a ‘bright line 
rule.’ . . . I agree that the majority’s interpretation is not absurd and 
do not dispute the advantages of a clear rule.  But I think the statute 
supplies a clear enough rule—transfers are exempt when there is 
confirmation and are not exempt when there is no confirmation.  
And I see no reason to adopt the majority’s preferred construction 
where it conflicts with the statute’s purpose.175 
Breyer intended his proposed rule to be administratively workable, while 
at the same time, avoiding results that appear contrary to the statute’s 
purpose. 
Ultimately, while the Supreme Court’s decision does offer a bright 
line rule, the Court only chose the lesser of two evils; the majority sided 
with the temporal limitation interpretation, while the dissenters endorsed 
the necessity interpretation.  Unfortunately, the Court provided no new 
insight or solutions, and the problems associated with the stamp tax ex-
emption and both interpretations remain. 
                                                        
 170. Id. at 2342. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 2341. 
 175. Id. at 2343. 
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As the rule currently stands, the end result is less money for credi-
tors, regardless of which route a debtor chooses.  On one hand, if the 
debtor chooses to continue with a pre-plan asset sale, the debtor will 
generally be able to realize a higher value for the assets through higher 
and more numerous bids but will be forced to pay the tax.  On the other 
hand, if the debtor waits until there is a confirmed plan in order to take 
advantage of the tax exemption, the debtor runs the risk of a lowered bid 
(if any), the depreciation of the asset, as well as the administrative costs 
of owning and maintaining the asset before plan confirmation.  Indeed, 
by choosing to sell its assets before its reorganization plan was con-
firmed, Piccadilly was able to realize a sale of $80 million through the 
bidding war created by the pre-plan asset sale process.176  This sale price 
is significantly higher than the $54 million offer made before Piccadilly 
filed for bankruptcy.177  These results do not fit with the legislative intent 
behind the stamp tax exemption, and in the end, if the Piccadilly ruling 
does not comport with the policies of bankruptcy, then Congress must re-
evaluate the provision. 
V.  CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Piccadilly and adoption of the 
temporal limitation interpretation has resulted in a strict rule that, while 
easy to apply, is riddled with problems.  The Court imposed an arbitrary 
timing requirement, completely disregarded congressional intent, and 
failed to develop a rule that comports with the practical realities of bank-
ruptcy.  With the increase in pre-confirmation asset sales, the tax exemp-
tion provision, specifically carved out by Congress over 100 years ago, 
will eventually lose its utility, if it has not already. 
In response to these concerns, many commentators have called for 
congressional intervention.178  Removing the temporal limitation and 
adding a notice provision will satisfy the critics while maintaining the 
benefits of the bright line rule.  Combining established boundaries with a 
more flexible provision that comports with the practical realities of bank-
ruptcy will increase transparency and not only strike a middle ground 
between debtors and the state taxing authorities, but also further the 
Code’s underlying purpose. 
                                                        
 176. See supra notes 108–09. 
 177. See Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.) 
(Piccadilly I), 379 B.R. 215, 218 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007), 
rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006). 
 178. Indeed, the majority in Piccadilly noted that Congress is the one who must determine if 
the provision should be revised.  Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2339 (“It is incumbent upon the Legis-
lature, and not the Judiciary, to determine whether § 1146 is in need of revision.”). 
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The following discussion urges Congress to implement a proposed 
revision and details the proposal’s advantages, such as its furtherance of 
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and its more accurate tracking of 
the legislative intent.  Next, the discussion explains the problems with 
removing the timing requirement and suggests a notice requirement.  Fi-
nally, this discussion addresses potential concerns with the proposed re-
vision. 
A.  Removal of the Temporal Limitation 
Congress’s most straightforward option is to remove the temporal 
limitation from the stamp tax exemption altogether.  Aligning with the 
view adopted by the Second and Eleventh circuits pre-Piccadilly, such a 
revision would allow for the exemption of both pre- and post-
confirmation transfer taxes.  The most sensible version to adopt is the 
version proffered by the Eleventh Circuit in Piccadilly, which would re-
move the temporal limitation, restrict the exemption to only those trans-
actions that are necessary to the confirmation of the plan, and require a 
nexus between the sale and the confirmation of the plan. 
First, to avoid confusion, the suggested new provision should in-
clude the language used in the previous versions of the stamp tax exemp-
tion; specifically, the revised stamp tax exemption should use the lan-
guage, “to make effective a plan” rather than “under a plan confirmed.”  
This revision would remove the temporal limitation while retaining the 
requirement of a nexus between the transfer and the eventual plan con-
firmation.  The tax exemption would apply to both pre- and post-
confirmation transfers, but it would only be valid if the transfer was a 
part of the debtor’s plan, which could be confirmed before or after the 
transfer. 
Unfortunately, the above revision does little to appease the many 
critics of the current stamp tax exemption or to address the reasons the 
exemption was the subject of litigation.  States would still not receive 
notice of these transactions, and the revision would still place the heavy 
administrative burden of preventing abuse of the exemption solely on the 
state.  In addition, the lack of regulation surrounding the provisions 
would increase the probability of overly expansive use.179  This problem, 
however, can be remedied with a simple notice provision. 
                                                        
 179. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.) 
(Piccadilly II), 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d,  128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008).  One of Flori-
da’s arguments for finding a temporal limitation within the tax exemption provision is the complete 
lack of notice of these transfers provided to states.  See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 5, Piccadilly III, 
128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008) (No 07-312), 2008 WL 742920. 
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B.  Notice Provision 
With the current provision, there is inadequate notice because, al-
though a pre-plan asset sale order will contain the court’s order exempt-
ing the parties from the stamp tax, only parties in interest180 are notified 
of the pre-plan sale.181  The state taxing authority is not considered a par-
ty in interest and thus never hears of the exemption and has no opportu-
nity to object to its use.  This problem was exemplified in NVR, where 
over 5,000 transfers of property occurred, each one exempt from stamp 
taxes.182  The state never received notice of these transactions.183  In or-
der to provide some semblance of enforcement of the provision, the state 
bore the high costs of monitoring the parties’ actions.  Taxing authorities 
argue that to force the authorities to monitor pre-plan transactions com-
pletely contradicts the premise behind stamp taxes, which are to be vir-
tually automatic upon recording.184 
Fortunately, these concerns can be resolved easily with a notice 
provision either included as a statutory revision within the Code, or, as 
this author suggests, promulgated by the Supreme Court in the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.185  In relevant part, the proposed notice 
provision would provide: 
Notice to Taxing Authorities. The clerk, or some other person as 
the court may direct, shall give the debtor, all creditors, and inden-
ture trustees not less than 20 days notice by mail of any proposed 
tax exemption pursuant to § 1146(a) of the Code.  All notices re-
quired by this subdivision shall be mailed to the Internal Revenue 
Service at its address set out in the register maintained under Rule 
5003(e) in which the case is pending; and to any state taxing author-
ity to which the debtor or any other party to the issuance, transfer, 
or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instru-
ment of transfer will become indebted to as a result of the issuance, 
transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an 
                                                        
 180. The Code does not expressly define the term “party in interest.”  See generally 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2009).  However, under Chapter 11, it is generally stated that “[a] party in interest, including 
the debtor, the trustee, a creditor’s committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an 
equity security holder, or an indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue 
in a case under this chapter.”  Id. § 1109(b). 
 181. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002. 
 182. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442, 448 
(4th Cir. 1999). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (No. 07-312), 2008 
WL 791974. 
 185. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2009).  Congress has authorized the federal judiciary to prescribe the 
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence for the federal courts, subject to the ultimate legislative 
right of Congress to reject, modify, or defer any of the rules.  Id.  The authority and procedures for 
promulgating rules are set forth in the Rules Enabling Act. Id. §§ 2071–2077. 
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instrument of transfer.  Notice of a tax-exempt issuance, transfer, or 
exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument 
of transfer shall include the time and place of any public sale, the 
terms and conditions of any private sale, and the time fixed for fil-
ing objections.  Notice shall also include the amount of the tax to be 
exempt and a general description of the property at issue. 
In the cases where the transfer is eventually part of the confirmed 
plan, the above notice provision will address many of the state taxing 
authorities’ concerns regarding the lack of notice and the high monitor-
ing costs.  The concerns that still need to be addressed include issues that 
arise where the plan is never confirmed and the case is either dismissed 
or converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding.  The following discussion ad-
dresses how the proposed notice provision will affect these situations. 
The proposed revision will solve the problem of applying the tax 
exemption to unconfirmed plans.  As previously noted, only 25% of 
plans are confirmed.186  The vast majority of the cases are dismissed or 
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding.187  With the proposed notice provi-
sion, these cases will no longer present an issue to the state taxing au-
thorities.  Although the state taxing authorities will still bear some moni-
toring costs, those costs will be greatly reduced because the notice provi-
sion will take the guessing game out of the process.  Simply stating in the 
proposed order that “any transfer taxes are exempt” would no longer be 
sufficient.  The debtor would be required to include specifics relating to 
the proposed transfers.  This reporting would require minimal paperwork 
for the debtor and the state taxing authorities would now have detailed 
information about each potential stamp tax exemption. 
The notice provision will also allow the state to plan accordingly, to 
ensure it gets priority over other creditors.  For example, consider a pre-
confirmation asset sale, which has to be approved by the court.  As soon 
as the taxing authority receives notice of the proposed sale, it could sub-
mit its own proposed order stating that in the event the plan is not con-
firmed, the state already has an allowed administrative claim for the 
amount of the stamp or transfer tax.188  Then, if the debtor converts from 
                                                        
 186. See supra note 71. 
 187. Id. 
 188. “[A] governmental unit shall not be required to file a request for the payment of an ex-
pense described in subparagraph (B) or (C), as a condition of its being an allowed administrative 
expense.”  11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (2009).  Subparagraph (B) states that “any tax—incurred by the 
estate, whether secured or unsecured, including property taxes for which liability is in rem, in perso-
nam, or both, except a tax of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 
503(b)(1)(B) (2009). 
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Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, this administrative claim will become a pre-
petition claim.189 
By claiming the tax as an administrative claim, the state taxing au-
thority would be securing its position in line with other creditors.  With 
the exceptions of secured claims and domestic support obligations, ad-
ministrative expenses have the highest priority in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.190  However, it is unlikely that there would be any domestic support 
obligations in a former Chapter 11 case, thus placing the administrative 
expenses at the front of the distribution line.  While Chapter 7 adminis-
trative expenses would be paid before Chapter 11 administrative ex-
penses,191 it is entirely possible that there would be enough money in the 
estate for both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 administrative claims, meaning 
the state taxing authority would be sure to receive payment.  In the alter-
native, when there is enough money for Chapter 7 administrative claims 
but not quite enough to cover all of the Chapter 11 administrative claims, 
the Chapter 11 administrative claims would still be entitled to receive a 
pro rata distribution.192 
The only scenario in which the state taxing authority would not be 
paid on its administrative claims is if the debtor is “administratively in-
solvent,” meaning there are insufficient funds in the case to pay all the 
expenses of administration193 or any unsecured creditors.  This result is 
not uncommon within the Code, however, because one of the main pur-
poses behind the Code is to treat each similarly situated creditor the 
same.  The state taxing authority cannot fault the Code for this result, nor 
should it expect to receive any special treatment. 
Some courts and commentators have suggested the use of escrow 
accounts to help solve this problem.194  However, a notice requirement is 
a superior solution.  The escrow scheme, as used in In re 310 Associates 
                                                        
 189. 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (2009). 
A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief but before 
conversion in a case that is converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title, oth-
er than a claim specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated for all purposes as 
if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of this petition. 
Id. 
 190. Id. §§ 507(a)(1)–(2) (2009). 
 191. Id. § 726(b). 
 192. See id. 
 193. A debtor is deemed “administratively insolvent” when there is insufficient unencumbered 
cash in the case to pay all expenses of administration under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) in full. 
 194. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, 30–32, Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (No. 
07-312), 2008 WL 791974 (questioning the use of escrow accounts, Justice Souter asked, “[I]sn’t it 
odd that the Congress would have required, we will assume, this escrow procedure when the odds 
are three to one against the non-taxability?”). 
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L.P.,195 allows for the sale to take place and the stamp tax to be placed in 
an escrow account.  The amount of the stamp tax remains in the escrow 
account until the debtor is able to confirm the plan.  If the transfer is 
made under a confirmed plan, then the funds in the escrow account are 
refunded to the debtor.  Conversely, if the transfer is not under the con-
firmed plan or a plan is never confirmed (e.g., if the debtor converts to 
Chapter 7), the funds in the escrow account are transferred to the appro-
priate taxing authority. 
Though use of escrow accounts resolves part of this problem, their 
use in fact fails to comport with the policies behind the Code because 
such accounts would upend the priority structure and ruin the distribution 
scheme.  The use of an escrow account would give the taxing authority 
priority over all creditors.  The taxing authority, as a government entity, 
is already accounted for within the administrative expenses provision.  
To remove them from this category, and give them ultimate priority over 
all other creditors would again subvert the Code’s purpose of providing 
equal treatment to all similarly situated creditors. 
Further, the taxing authority’s concern that the case might ultimate-
ly be dismissed rather than converted does not warrant the use of escrow 
accounts.  When a Chapter 11 case is dismissed, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, the taxing authority would still be treated as a post-petition 
creditor because the claim arose after the debtor filed for bankruptcy.  
Whether considering dismissal or conversion, the court must decide 
which route is in the best interest of the creditors, including those with 
post-petition claims.196  Making this decision means that if a Chapter 11 
case has been dismissed, the court has decided that the creditors, includ-
ing the state tax authority, will fare better outside of bankruptcy.  Again, 
the state can have little issue with this position.  By explicitly setting 
forth a procedure, the Code has been designed to allow for this uncertain-
ty and to give the state any other position goes against the Code in its 
entirety. 
                                                        
 195. 282 B.R. 295, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The bankruptcy court’s order approving the 
transfer agreement between the debtor and the purchaser provided as follows: 
As soon as practicable after the Closing, the Debtor shall be, and hereby is, authorized to 
deposit in a separate, interest bearing escrow account, monies from the Account (as de-
fined herein below [sic]), earmarked “310 Associates, L.P.-City 1146(c) taxes,” the sum 
of $100,000, or such other amount as may be necessary (the “Escrowed Funds”) to pay 
any City real property transfer tax or any other City stamp or similar tax, and any poten-
tial interest and/or penalties thereon that may be due on the recordation of any documents 
or instruments reflecting the sale of the Assets subject to this Order. . . . If a Plan of Re-
organization in this case ultimately is not confirmed, the City may apply to this Court for 
appropriate relied, and this Order is without prejudice to the rights of the City in such 
eventuality. 
 196. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2009). 
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With the proposed notice provision, the situation in Piccadilly 
could have been avoided.  The Florida Department of Revenue would 
have received notice of the sale without the unnecessary and burdensome 
monitoring costs, and Piccadilly would have still benefited from the 
stamp tax exemption.  In essence, the application of the stamp tax ex-
emption would no longer be a zero sum game.  Analyzing the Piccadilly 
decision in this way highlights the restrictive nature of the temporal limi-
tation and just how simple it would be to ensure the policy behind the 
Bankruptcy Code is supported. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
With the current economic crisis upon us, the reality is that the 
stamp tax exemption will have little effect on either a debtor’s ability or 
willingness to reorganize.  The excessive debt leverage, economic down-
turn, and lack of available credit in the credit market will force more and 
more companies into pre-confirmation asset sales.  It is unlikely that 
lenders will be willing to risk the additional time and cost of confirming 
the plan needed for reorganization.  If the purpose behind the special tax 
provisions is to promote reorganization and provide a greater chance of 
emerging on the other side, as this author believes it to be, then Congress 
must consider revising the provision or risk losing the provision’s utility.  
In revising the provision, Congress should require a nexus between any 
transfer and the confirmed plan as well as the use of a notice provision in 
order to provide safeguards for both the states and the debtors alike. 
